Starting around 15:20 UTC on July 17, 2025, some edge delivery server sets in the US location began experiencing connectivity issues. This resulted in availability issues for the traffic traversed through the affected server sets. The impact was on both HTTP & HTTPS server sets, and approximately 15-20% of the overall traffic was affected on those server sets. Akamai’s proactive monitoring system detected this issue, triggered internal alerts, and the appropriate actions were taken. Out of an abundance of caution, Akamai removed the affected server sets from the production service. This action was completed at around 17:15 UTC on July 17, 2025. Following these actions, the internal alerts were cleared, and the impact was mitigated.

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Akamai discovered a common error logged on multiple core network devices and escalated it to the third-party router vendor. Upon investigation, it was determined that an invalid route of 0.0.0.0/1 announced by one of Akamai's peers triggered a software defect in the core devices logging the error.  Unfortunately, the third-party vendor was unable to provide remediation options beyond upgrades and reloads.

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During these remediation upgrades in our Miami datacenter, packet loss was detected when accessing Akamai’s Compute site in Miami after an initial device upgrade took place starting around 12:57 UTC on July 19, 2025. As a precautionary measure, emergency actions were taken to complete the remediation upgrade on the remaining Miami devices, which fully returned to service at 16:30 UTC on July 19, 2025. Follow-up investigation later revealed a collision of maintenance actions in 2 metros that shared connectivity likely contributed to the loss.

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Akamai upgraded the firmware version of all the impacted network routers in phases across the platform. Akamai eliminated the risk of recurrence as of 10:47 UTC on July 29, 2025, after all the impacted network routers were upgraded and rebooted.

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To prevent recurrence, Akamai will strengthen the defensive posture of BGP policies and update internal router SQA tests for invalid routes.

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This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing, and any information herein is subject to change.